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ABSTRACT
A5-GMR-1 is a synchronous stream cipher used to provide
confidentiality for communications between satellite phones
and satellites. The keystream generator may be considered
as a finite state machine, with an internal state of 81 bits.
The design is based on four linear feedback shift registers,
three of which are irregularly clocked. The keystream gen-
erator takes a 64-bit secret key and 19-bit frame number as
inputs, and produces an output keystream of length berween
28 and 210 bits.
Analysis of the initialisation process for the keystream
generator reveals serious flaws which significantly reduce the
number of distinct keystreams that the generator can pro-
duce. Multiple (key, frame number) pairs produce the same
keystream, and the relationship between the various pairs
is easy to determine. Additionally, many of the keystream
sequences produced are phase shifted versions of each other,
for very small phase shifts. These features increase the ef-
fectiveness of generic time-memory tradeoff attacks on the
cipher, making such attacks feasible.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Symmetric cryptography and
hash functions; Block and stream ciphers; Cryptanalysis
and other attacks;
Keywords
Stream ciphers; satellite phones; initialisation; cryptanaly-
sis; time-memory attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Satellite phones, or satphones, use satellites in Earth’s or-
bit to establish network connections, providing phone cover-
age without the terrestrial infrastructure required for cellu-
lar mobile phones. There are two main satphone standards,
known as GMR-1, and GMR-2. Details of the encryption
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algorithms used to protect the communication between sat-
phone and satellite have been made public recently. These
were obtained by reverse engineering satphones. Descrip-
tions of the stream ciphers used with GMR-1 and GMR-
2, known as A5-GMR1 and A5-GMR2, respectively, are
given in [3], along with preliminary cryptanalysis of the al-
gorithms. In this paper we focus on the initialisation process
of the A5-GMR-1 algorithm.
Satphone communications are divided into frames. Each
frame is encrypted by XORing with a binary keystream se-
quence. The A5-GMR-1 keystream generator uses a secret
64-bit key, K, for all frames in a conversation. This se-
cret key is combined with a known 19-bit frame number, E,
which differs for each frame. Initialisation using K and E
must be performed before a keystream segment of the re-
quired length can be generated and used for encryption or
decryption of the frame. An outline of the initialisation pro-
cess is provided in [3] with additional detail given in [4]. A
good initialisation process should ensure that each (K,E)
pair generates a distinct and unpredictable keystream se-
quence, and that multiple sequences produced with the same
key but different frame numbers appear unrelated. Also, if
the internal state of the keystream generator is revealed at
some time during keystream generation, it should be difficult
to establish the secret key from the known state.
In this paper, we consider the description of A5-GMR-
1 gleaned from [3] and [4]. We investigate vulnerabilities
introduced by poor design choices in the initialisation pro-
cess. We consider the keystream generator as a finite state
machine, and examine the state cycles formed by tracing
paths of state transitions that occur during initialisation and
keystream generation. We make observations about possible
initial states and the subsequent paths of internal states and
relate these to the corresponding keystream sequences. Un-
fortunately, for A5-GMR-1 the initialisation process results
in multiple (K,E) pairs that produce the same keystream se-
quence, and it is simple to determine relationships between
the values of K and E for which this occurs. We identify
features of the initialisation process that greatly reduce the
keystream variability and therefore reduce the resistance of
A5-GMR-1 to common forms of known-plaintext attack.
2. DESCRIPTION OF A5-GMR-1
The A5-GMR-1 keystream generator is a finite state ma-
chine with the state contained in four binary linear feedback
shift registers (LFSRs) [3]. The LFSRs are denoted R1, R2,
R3 and R4; and have 19, 22, 23 and 17 binary stages, respec-
tively. Thus the keystream generator has an internal state
size of 81 bits. Figure 1 shows the four LFSRs and the as-
sociated functions for keystream generation mode. Table 1
gives the feedback polynomials for the LFSRs.
 
Figure 1: The A5-GMR1 keystream generator
The A5-GMR-1 cipher has two modes of operation: ini-
tialisation and keystream generation. The same LFSRs are
used in each mode, but the state update functions vary de-
pending on whether clocking of the registers is regular or
irregular. Note that R4 is always regularly clocked.
Let Ri,j denote the j
th stage of the ith register, for ap-
propriate i and j, and Ri,j(t) denote the contents of this
stage at time t. When irregular clocking is used, the con-
tents of three stages from R4 (namely R4,1, R4,6 and R4,15)
are used as inputs to a majority function M to determine
which of the other three registers will be clocked. The ma-
jority function is a quadratic boolean function represented
algebraically as M(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x1x3. This
function controls the clocking of registers R1, R2 and R3 as
follows:
Iff M(R4,1, R4,6, R4,15) =

R4,15 then R1 is clocked.
R4,6 then R2 is clocked.
R4,1 then R3 is clocked.
(1)
The use of the majority function means that at least two
of the three registers, R1, R2 and R3, will be clocked at
each time step. The clock control is denoted C in Figure 1.
We describe the steps in the initialisation and keystream
generation processes below.
2.1 Initialisation
The A5-GMR-1 cipher uses a 64-bit key K and 19-bit
frame number E. Let ki represent the i
th bit of K, where
0 ≤ i < 64, so that K is represented by K = (k0k1 . . . k63).
Similarly, let ej represent the j
th bit of E, where 0 ≤ j < 19,
so that E is represented by E = (e0e1 . . . e18). To produce
the keystream sequence that will be used to encrypt frame
number E in the communication, both K and E are input
to the initialisation mode.
Initialisation is performed in two phases, which we refer to
as loading and diffusion. First the 64-bit K and 19-bit E
are combined to form a 64-bit initialisation vector I, where
I is represented by I = (v0v1 . . . v63). This vector is loaded
into the internal state, and then a nonlinear update function
is applied for diffusion.
Note that the bits in I are obtained as linear combinations
of the bits of K and E [4]:
I = [v0v1 . . . v63]
= [(k15 ⊕ e18)(k14 ⊕ e17)(k13 ⊕ e16)(k12 ⊕ e15)(k11 ⊕ e14)
(k10 ⊕ e13)(k9 ⊕ e12)(k8 ⊕ e11)(k7 ⊕ e10)(k6 ⊕ e9)(k5 ⊕ e8)
(k4 ⊕ e7)(k3 ⊕ e6)k2k1k0k31k30k29k28k27k26k25k24(k23 ⊕ e5)
(k22 ⊕ e4)k21k20k19k18k17k16k47k46 . . . k33k32(k63 ⊕ e3)
(k62 ⊕ e2)(k61 ⊕ e1)(k60 ⊕ e0)k59k58k57k56k55k54k53k52
k51k50k49k48)
Specifically, the initialisation is performed as follows:
• Loading phase:
1. The content of each stage in each of the registers
is set to 0.
2. The 64-bit initialization vector I is formed from
K and E.
3. Over the next 64 clocks I is loaded into each of
the four registers separately, using regular clock-
ing. For Ri, where i = 1, 2, 3, 4 the loading is
performed by XORing a bit of I with the linear
feedback for Ri to form the new contents of Ri,0.
4. The contents of register stages Ri,0, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4
are set to 1.
• Diffusion phase:
1. The cipher is clocked 250 times. R4 is regularly
clocked each time, and controls the clocking of
the other registers as in Equation 1. During this
time no keystream output is produced.
For a given K and E, we refer to the internal state of the
keystream generator at the end of the loading phase as the
loaded state, and at the end of the diffusion phase as the
initial state, respectively. Once the initial state is formed,
the generator can begin to produce the keystream sequence.
2.2 Keystream Generation
In keystream generation mode, the state update function
for the cipher is the same as during the diffusion phase of
initialisation. Register R4 is regularly clocked and the ma-
jority function M is applied to the contents of three stages
of R4 to determine which of the other three registers will be
clocked, as outlined in Equation 1.
Each time the internal state is updated, the output func-
tion is applied and a keystream bit produced. The output
function takes inputs from 12 stages in the internal state:
four from each of registers R1,R2 and R3. Three of the stages
in each register are used as input to the majority function
M and the output ofM is XORed with the contents of an-
other stage in the register. Then the resultant values from
each register are linearly combined. Specifically,
zt =M(R1,1(t), R1,6(t), R1,15(t))⊕R1,11(t)
⊕M(R2,3(t), R2,8(t), R2,14(t))⊕R2,1(t)
⊕M(R3,4(t), R3,15(t), R3,19(t))⊕R3,0(t). (2)
Register Length Feedback polynomial
R1 19 x19 + x18 + x17x14 + 1
R2 22 x22 + x21 + x17x13 + 1
R3 23 x23 + x22 + x19x18 + 1
R4 17 x17 + x14 + x13x9 + 1
Table 1: LFSR feedback polynomials
The amount of keystream required to encrypt or decrypt
a frame depends on the transmission channel. In [3] frame
lengths for the TCH3, TCH6 and TCH9 channels are given
as m = 208, 420 and 648 bits, respectively. For a given
K and E, 2m bits are produced, with either the first m or
second m bits of the keystream being used, depending on the
direction of the transmission (satphone to satellite, or vice
versa). Following this, the frame number is incremented and
the keystream generator reinitialised. Thus for a particular
frame in a conversation, the amount of keystream available
for a known plaintext attack is quite small: between 28 and
210 bits.
3. OBSERVATIONS
In this section we consider the A5-GMR-1 keystream gen-
erator as a finite state machine. We make a series of ob-
servations about the number of distinct internal states of
the keystream generator that can be obtained at various
points of the initialisation process; during the loading phase,
through the diffusion phase and also during keystream gen-
eration. As the A5-GMR-1 state update function is the same
during diffusion and keystream generation, we determine the
possible cycles of internal states that can occur during both
the diffusion phase of initialisation and keystream genera-
tion.
1. Number of distinct initialisation vectors After
Step 2 of the loading phase in the initialisation process,
a 64-bit vector I is formed, with elements which are
simple linear combinations of bits of the 64-bit K and
19-bit E. There are 264+19 = 283 distinct (K,E) pairs,
but only 264 distinct I. We note that, given the linear
combination, there are 219 distinct (K,E) pairs for
each I.
2. Number of distinct loaded states In Step 3 of the
loading phase in the initialisation process, I is loaded
into each of the registers linearly. The last iteration of
this process includes the final bit of I (v63 = k48) in
the new value of register stages Ri,0, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
However, in Step 4, the value of Ri,0, for i = 1, 2, 3, and
4 is set to 1. Thus v63 = k48 is ineffective in forming
the loaded states (equivalent to using a 63-bit key).
That is, although there are 283 distinct (K, E) pairs,
and 264 distinct values for I, there are only 263 distinct
loaded states in total. Therefore there are 220 distinct
(K, E) pairs for each loaded state of A5-GMR-1.
3. Maximum number of possible states: The final
step of the loading phase sets Ri,0 = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3
and 4. Thus no LFSR can be in an all-zero state at the
start of the diffusion phase. During both diffusion and
keystream generation, R4,0 is autonomous and regu-
larly clocked. Aside from the clock control, registers
Ri for i = 1, 2, 3 are also autonomous in these phases.
If clocked, the new value for Ri,0(t + 1) is computed
by applying the feedback function for Ri (given in Ta-
ble 1) to Ri(t), where i = 1, 2, 3 and 4. Given the
non-zero loaded states for each register and the use of
primitive polynomials for the feedback functions, no
register will revert to an all zero state. The number of
possible states for each component register Ri is given
by 2|Ri| − 1, where |Ri| denotes the length of Ri, for
i = 1, 2, 3 and 4. Therefore, after the loading phase,
the maximum number of possible states the keystream
generator can be in at any time is given by:
G = (2|R1| − 1)(2|R2| − 1)(2|R3| − 1)(2|R4| − 1)
= (219 − 1)(222 − 1)(223 − 1)(217 − 1) ≈ 281
4. Cyclic structure of state transition graph: The
irregular clocking of R1, R2 and R3 is under the con-
trol of regularly clocked R4. There are 2
17−1 possible
non-zero states for R4, each with one successor state
and one predecessor state. Therefore each state in the
A5-GMR-1 state transition graph has exactly one suc-
cessor state and one predecessor state. That is, all of
the states in the state transition graph lie on cycles:
either one cycle that encompasses all G states, or on
several disjoint cycles.
5. Number of distinct cycles: After the loading phase
of initialisation, no register can be in an all-zero state.
Thus the binary sequence produced by R4 has period
PR4 = 2
17 − 1 = 131, 071. Consider possible values of
the three stages of R4 providing inputs to the major-
ity function as a triplet. In one complete cycle of the
non-zero states of R4, each triplet occurs 2
14 times,
except for the all zero triplet, which occurs 214 − 1
times. Thus completing one cycle of R4 states results
in each of the other three registers being clocked ex-
actly 6× 214 − 1 = 98, 303 times. The state cycles for
R1, R2 and R3, if regularly clocked, contain (2
19 − 1),
(222 − 1) and (223 − 1) states, respectively. All of
these values are relatively prime to 98, 303, and to each
other. Therefore, the structure of the state transition
graph for the A5-GMR-1 cipher during the diffusion
and keystream generation phases is one big cycle that
encompasses all G states.
6. Number of distinct initial states Consider the
loaded state corresponding to a (K,E) pair as a start-
ing point on a path of internal state values. Under the
state update function for both diffusion and keystream
generation, the internal states form a single cycle con-
taining G states. In the diffusion phase the state up-
date function is bijective, and is applied 250 times.
Therefore every distinct loaded state has a correspond-
ing initial state which is a distance of 250 steps away
on the state cycle.
7. Number of distinct internal states visited dur-
ing keystream generation Consider the production
of keystream segments of length 210 bits (longer than
used in the satphone application described). Generat-
ing a keystream segment of this length involves step-
ping through 210 distinct internal states. Suppose this
path of 210 internal states contains no states which are
themselves initial states (that is, no paths have over-
lapping segments). As there are only 263 distinct initial
states, this assumption implies that 273 distinct inter-
nal states can be visited during keystream generation,
over all possible (K,E) values. Note that this is much
less than the value of G; given the number of distinct
initial states and the length of the keystream required
for the application, if the initial states are uniformly
scattered across the state cycle then the proportion of
internal states ever visited during keystream genera-
tion is approximately 273/281 = 2−8. If the assump-
tion that there are no overlapping paths does not hold,
then the number of distinct initial states that will ever
be visited during keystream generation will be further
reduced. Clearly, a large proportion of possible inter-
nal state values for A5-GMR1 will never be reached in
the satphone application.
4. INVESTIGATING THE INITIAL STATE
DISTRIBUTION
In this section we investigate the distribution of initial
states on the A5-GMR1 state transition graph to determine
whether paths of internal states do overlap. In that case,
segments of the corresponding keystreams also overlap and
the keystreams produced from these initial states will be
phase-shifted versions of one another. There is a direct cor-
respondence between loaded and initial states, with initial
states at a fixed distance of 250 steps ahead of the respec-
tive loaded state on the state cycle. Hence the distribution
of initial states on the A5-GMR1 state transition graph is
the same as the distribution of loaded states. As loaded
states have a readily detectable format, we investigate the
distribution of loaded states instead.
4.1 Distribution of loaded states
Loaded states in A5-GMR1 have a particular format, due
to both the construction of I and the loading phase during
initialisation being entirely linear. Although there are 81
stages in the state, the contents of four of these stages are
set to 1, and the other 77 stages are linear combinations
of the 63 bits of I: v0v1 . . . v62. Thus the loaded state can
be described by a system of 77 linear equations in 63 vari-
ables. As this system is overdetermined by fourteen linear
equations, these fourteen equations and also Ri,0 = 1, for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 can be used as a sufficient condition to deter-
mine whether a particular internal state is a loaded state for
some set of (K,E) values.
Consider the possibility that the distance between two
loaded states L1 and L2 is one. That is, L2 is the state
obtained after the state update function has been applied to
L1. We derive a system of linear equations to identify loaded
states L1 which, when the cipher is clocked once, produce
another loaded state, L2 (so the required format holds for
L2 also). We refer to L1 and L2 as a slid pair with distance
1. As the clocking during diffusion is irregular, there are
four cases to consider, based on the possible values of the
inputs to M. These are given in Table 2, where for brevity
we use a, b ∈ {0, 1} with b denoting the binary complement
of a.
Considering the pair-wise XOR of the R4 input values to
M in L1, we have three linear equations in each of these four
cases. For L2 to also be a loaded state two conditions have
to be met. Firstly, we require the contents of Ri,0 = 1, for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4. This provides four equations in the case where
all four registers are clocked, and three equations in cases
where one of the registers is not clocked. Secondly, we have
the 14 linear equations relating state bits as a result of the
overdefined equation system for loaded states. Therefore,
we have 21 or 22 linear, though not neccesarily independent,
equations. To determine the number of linearly independent
equations, and hence the number of free variables, we can
calculate the ranks of these matrices. The results are listed
in Table 3. Thus there are 253 + 244 + 244 + 244 ≈ 253.0084
pairs of loaded states with a distance of 1.
A similar method can be used to derive equations for slid
pairs L1 and L2 with a distance of two, or three, or greater.
However, this will result in some double counting. Consider
three loaded states; L1, L2 and L3; where L1 and L2 have
distance 1, and L2 and L3 have distance 1. Then the dis-
tance between L1 and L3 is two. To count loaded states
that are exclusively at distance 2 from other loaded states,
we need to adjust to account for the mumber of slid pairs of
distance 1 also included. That is, the number of slid pairs
of exactly distance 2 is given by the number of slid pairs of
distance two less the number of consecutive slid pairs of dis-
tance 1. This approach is extended to determine the number
of slid pairs of loaded states that are exclusively of distance
3. The number of slid pairs exclusively at distance 1, 2 and
3 are given in Table 4.
4.2 Distribution of initial states
From Table 4 it is clear that the 263 distinct loaded states
for A5-GMR1 are not uniformly distributed around the in-
ternal state cycle. Many loaded states are only a short dis-
tance from each other. As there are exactly 250 state tran-
sitions from each loaded state to the corresponding initial
state, then the 263 distinct initial states are similarly dis-
tributed. The number of distinct internal states that will
ever be visited during keystream generation, across all pos-
sible (K,E) values, is clearly much less than 273, and repre-
sents much less than 2−8 of the possible 81-bit internal state
values.
For some initial states, the subsequent state is also an
initial state. This implies that the two keystreams pro-
duced by a slid pair of initial states will be phase shifts
of each other, for very short shift distances. Hence many
of the keystream segments produced will have substantial
overlapping segments. This reduces the variability of the
keystreams produced to encrypt each frame.
5. ATTACKING A5-GMR1
In this section we discuss several simple attacks on the A5-
GMR1 keystream generator. Firstly, we describe attacks in
the existing public literature: a guess and determine attack
presented as the preliminary cryptanalysis of the keystream
R4,15 R4,6 R4,1 M R4,15 ⊕R4,6 R4,6 ⊕R4,1 R4,15 ⊕R4,1
a a a a 0 0 0
a a b a 0 1 1
a b a a 1 1 0
a b b b 1 0 1
Table 2: Register clocking
Registers Clocked Rank Free variables Number of states
R1, R2, R3and R4 10 53 2
53
R1, R2 and R4 19 44 2
44
R2, R3 and R4 19 44 2
44
R1, R3 and R4 19 44 2
44
Table 3: Equation systems for loaded states with distance 1
generator in [3], and an improved version in [4] that uses
keystreams from multiple frames. Then we discuss the ap-
plication of a generic time-memory attack to the cipher.
5.1 Previous Attacks
Preliminary cryptanalysis in [3] describes a known-plaintext
attack on the A5-GMR-1 cipher that adapts the ideas of
Petrovic and Fuster-Sabater [6]. The approach is to make
a 16-bit guess of the contents of R4 at the end of the load-
ing phase, and then combine this with an algebraic attack.
The contents of R4 determine the clocking of the other regis-
ters so, for any particular guess, the A5-GMR1 state update
function is essentially linear. Variables are assigned to the
(18 + 21 + 22 = 61) unknown contents of the stages in
the other three registers. The internal state values at future
time points can then be expressed as linear combinations
of these variables. The output function is quadratic, so the
known keystream bits can be expressed as a series of binary
quadratic equations in terms of the assigned variables. Lin-
earization can be applied to create a linear system in 655
variables. Using the known keystream to solve the system
of equations yields values in a loaded state for R1, R2 and R3
that correspond to the guessed R4. The candidate solution
should be tested to determine if it is correct (produces the
same keystream). If not, the guessed value of R4 is discarded
and the process repeated for another 16-bit guess. If a suit-
able candidate is found, then I is obtained from the loaded
state, and then K is obtained from I, given the known value
of E.
A limitation of this approach is the keystream require-
ment: at least 655 consecutive bits must be produced from
a single initialisation. This exceeds the frame lengths noted
in [3] for the transmission channels. Thus the attack as
described in [3] is of academic interest but not practically
feasible. Also, apart from the condition that Ri,0 = 1, for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the attack does not consider the loading phase
in the initialisation process. It begins by assigning variables
to the loaded state. Thus for each 16 bit guess of R4, 61 vari-
ables are required for the unknown stages in the remaining
registers. This is almost as many variables as in the initiali-
sation vector I. When the additional computation required
to solve the equation systems is included, this approach is
less effective than exhaustive search over the effective 63 bits
of I or, for that matter, K.
To reduce the number of variables in these keystream
equations and hence reduce the keystream requirement, the
number of guessed state bits can be increased to include
some of the stages in registers R1, R2 and R3. For exam-
ple, guessing an additional 17 bits can reduce the number
of variables in the equation system to 345. This approach
requires guessing 33 bits in total, and then constructing and
solving a system of equations in 345 variables for each guess.
Meeting the reduced keystream requirement is achieved at
a cost of an increased number of candidate guesses, and so
the attack remains impractical.
In [4] the limitation on obtaining sufficient keystream from
a single frame is dealt with by noting that two initial states
generated from the same key but with different frame num-
bers are linearly related (corresponds to our Observation
1). The XOR difference between two frame numbers thus
translates to a linear difference in the 81-bit initial states
in the different frames. This corresponds to a linear trans-
lation of the constructed equation system to be solved, as
the matrix relating the initial state to the keystream will be
different for different frames. Multiple consecutive frames
(approximately 12 or 13) in the same communication were
required, but this attack could be successfully implemented
on obtained keystream. That is, it is the linear combination
of the key bits and frame number bits that makes it pos-
sible to obtain sufficient keystream to perform an algebraic
attack.
5.2 Time/Memory/Data Attack
In this section we investigate the application of generic
Time/Memory/Data (TMD) attacks to A5-GMR-1. TMD
attacks have been proposed as a means to invert functions.
Given the output of a function, an attacker can use a TMD
attack to recover the input. The TMD attack can be applied
to stream ciphers as a known-plaintext attack. The known
plaintext is used to reveal keystream segments, and these are
used to try to identify the underlying internal state. In Sec-
tion 4 we showed that, given the initialisation procedure, the
possible internal state values of A5-GMR-1 occuring during
keystream generation represent only a small fraction of the
state values. This resulted in reduced variability of the re-
sultant keystreams, and indicates that A5-GMR-1 may be
vulnerable to TMD attacks.
Time memory attacks are performed in two phases: a
precomputation phase in which lookup tables are prepared,
and an online phase in which the attacker obtains data and
searches the lookup table to find a match that enables the
function to be inverted. Time-Memory-Data attacks are ex-
Distance (exclusive) Number of states Proportion of states
1 253.0084 0.0982%
2 252.0278 0.0498%
3 251.2945 0.0299%
TOTAL 253.8657 0.1799%
Table 4: Pairs of loaded states with exclusive distance 1, 2 or 3
pressed in terms of the following parameters:
• N - Size of the search space
• P - Precomputation time (time required to generate
lookup table)
• M - Amount of random access memory to store pre-
computed data
• T - Time required for online phase
• D - Amount of data available to the attacker in the
online phase.
We consider two Time/Memory/Data Tradeoff attacks
here: the original attack described independently by Bab-
bage [1] and Golic [5], referred to as the Babbage-Golic at-
tack, and the attack described by Biryukov and Shamir [2],
referred to as the Biryukov-Shamir attack. The Babbage-
Golic attack has a tradeoff curve DM = N , with T = D and
P = M . As noted in [2], T can be reduced if some of the
input data is selectively ignored, but we don’t consider that
to be the case here. The tradeoff curve for the Biryukov-
Shamir attack is TD2M2 = N2, with D2 ≤ T ≤ N and
P = N/D.
Consider the size of the search space. If we search for the
input pair (K,E) to the cipher, then N = 264+19 = 283.
Note that this is greater than the set of all possible state
values. If we search over all possible internal states of the ci-
pher, then N = 281. However, from Section 4 it is clear that
many internal states will never be visited during keystream
generation, so this is a wasteful approach. If we search in-
stead for initial states, this is reduced to N = 263. In this
case, we construct the lookup table by randomly choosing
M 63-bit initialisation vectors Ii (with v63 set to 0 since it
is ineffective), and for each deriving an initial state, Si, and
producing a 63-bit keystream segment Zi. The lookup table
consists of pairs of entries (Zi, Si).
In the online phase, given some keystream data, we ap-
ply a 63-bit sliding window and consider all possible 63-
bit keystream segments that can be formed from the data
stream. If we find a Zt that exists in our table, then we know
the internal state at that time was St. As the state update
function is bijective, this can be readily inverted to obtain
the corresponding initial state Si and the initialisation vec-
tor Ii. Given that the frame number E is known, the secret
key K can be reconstructed (apart from the ineffective bit
k48, as noted in Observation 5). One lookup table with M
initial state entries will suffice for all K and E values.
Now consider the data available to an attacker. If the
keystream from only one frame is available, we have at least
208 bits, which provides 145 63-bit keystream segments, so
D = 145. D can be readily increased by using data from
multiple frames, with a maximum of 219 frames. That is,
the maximum value for D ≈ 226. For the Babbage-Golic
attack with N = 263, if D = T = 226 then M = P = 237.
Clearly constructing a lookup table for this value for M is
feasible, although D is extremely large. Reducing D to 220
will increase M to 243, which is easily possible.
Similarly, for the Biryukov-Shamir attack if D = 226 then
TM2 = 274, with T > 252, so requirements for M are again
very small. Tradoffs that reduce D substantially can still be
performed for feasible values of M and T . For example, if
D = 220 then TM2 = 286, with T > 240, and M < 223.
5.3 Vulnerabilities related to initialisation
There are several serious flaws in the initialisation process
that make A5-GMR1 vulnerable to attack. These relate to
design decisions in how the 64-bit key K and the 19-bit
frame number E are used to form the initial state. In the
loading phase, the 64-bit key K and the 19-bit frame number
E are combined linearly to form a 64-bit value I, which is
then loaded into the component LFSRs in a linear way to
form an 81-bit state, and then four of those bits are set to a
constant value of 1. Unfortunately the stages in each register
which are set to the value 1 correspond to the bit in I formed
from a single key bit k48. This step effectively removes that
key bit from the keystream generator. The loading phase
has thus reduced 83 bits of input to 63 bits in forming the
initial state. The diffusion phase of the initialisation process
has no further external input, so cannot introduce any more
variability.
The linearity of the combining function is a vulnerabil-
ity exploited by the multi-frame algebraic attacks in [4]. It
is also a contributing factor to the success of the generic
TMD attacks, as a single lookup table can be used for data
obtained from any frame. Essentially, the lookup table con-
structed in the precomputation stage of a TMD attack is
based on I. Then in the online attack phase, once a match
for a value of I is obtained in any frame, the known value
of E can be substituted to obtain the corresponding values
for K. Note that there will be two keys which are valid for
any case, as the value of k48 can be either 0 or 1, since it
is not actually effective. The TMD attacks are aided by the
reduction in the effective initial state space, noted above,
and also by the fact that a large proportion of the possi-
ble internal states of the cipher will never be visited during
the keystream generation process. Different design choices
regarding the loading and diffusion phases of initialisation
may have made both of these attacks more difficult.
6. CONCLUSION
A5-GMR-1 is a synchronous stream cipher used to provide
confidentiality for communications between satellite phones
and satellites. The use of linear feedback shift registers in
the design makes it vulnerable to algebraic attacks, although
guessing a large number of state bits and solving large sys-
tems of equations is required in order for these attacks to be
applied. These attacks recover the internal state of the ci-
pher, and then work backwards to determine the value of the
secret key. Given the relatively small amount of keystream
produced per frame, a naive implemetation of an algebraic
attack is not feasible. A more complex algebraic attack
which uses keystreams from multiple consecutive frames is
possible, requiring the use of linear translations of the equa-
tion system for each frame.
In this paper, we consider A5-GMR1 as a finite state ma-
chine, and analyse the state transitions during both the ini-
tialisation and keystream generation processes. Our analy-
sis reveals several serious flaws in the initialisation process
which significantly reduce the number of distinct keystreams
that the cipher can produce.
Although the keystream generator takes a 64-bit key and a
19-bit frame number as inputs to an 81-bit state, the flaws in
the initialisation process mean that only 263 distinct initial
states can be formed, and hence only 263 distinct keystreams
can actually be produced. Many of these distinct keystreams
are phase shifted versions of each other, for very small phase
shifts (say 1, 2 or 3 bits). Thus, the internal state values
that can occur during keystream generation represents only
a small proportion of all possible internal state values. Addi-
tionally, the linear method for combining the key and frame
number during initialisation makes it simple to determine
(key, frame number) pairs which produce the same initial
state, and hence produce exactly the same keystream. There
are 220 such (key, frame number) pairs for each keystream.
Finally, we point out that although the cipher uses a 64-
bit key, the initialisation process quickly cancels the effect
of one of these key bits during the loading process. These
flaws in the initialisation process reduce the effective state
size from 81 bits to 63.
Given the key size, this reduction clearly shows that A5-
GMR-1 will be vulnerable to simple generic time-memory
tradeoff attacks. Multiple points on the TMD tradeoff curve
(time, memory and known keystream requirements) show
this approach to be feasible in the satellite phone application
scenario.
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